we can generalize his findings. That is, Libet suggested that what he thought he found in this particular laboratory setting applies to all of our bodily actions.

Here it is in a nutshell. Libet thought that the decision to flex now—not just to flex sooner or later, or at some time or other—was made when the RP began. That was about a half second before muscle motion began. But because people’s average time of first reported awareness of the decision was much closer to the time muscle motion begins—about a fifth of a second before it—he concluded that these people became conscious of their decisions to flex only after the decisions had actually been made (see figure 2.1). And because Libet thought that to make a decision freely we need to make it consciously, he concluded that these people did not freely decide to flex and that free will wasn’t involved in producing their flexings.

![Figure 2.1](image)

**Figure 2.1** Libet’s findings.
time with the rhythm. If I asked you to think of the nearest street, you might slowly and unconsciously move your hand toward that street. If I got you to hide something in my office and then asked you to think about the object, you might—without realizing it—very slowly move your hand in its direction. If I ask you whether you moved your hand and you say you didn’t, we have evidence that people sometimes perform actions that they’re not conscious of and don’t consciously intend. Evidence of this kind is a plank in Wegner’s argument that conscious proximal intentions are never among the causes of corresponding actions.

Wegner offers further evidence. A technique called “facilitated communication” was intended to help people with communication problems caused by such conditions as severe autism or cerebral palsy. Trained facilitators had the job of helping these people touch keys on a keyboard—keys the clients were trying to touch in order to type sentences. Facilitators were supposed to avoid controlling